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Abstract This paper analyzes the influence of the two most commonly examined
causes of presidential vote choice, policy preferences and party identification. The
focus is on change across elections in order to assess how the effects of issues and
partisanship respond to the larger political context in which voters make their
decisions. In contrast to party centric views of politics, I find little direct respon-
siveness to party issue contrast and substantial influence of candidate issue contrast.
Further, I find that leading hypotheses for the ‘‘resurgence in partisanship’’ are not
consistent with some important facts suggesting that the explanation remains
elusive.
Keywords Presidential elections  Voting  Party identification 
Partisan resurgence  Issues  Policy preferences
Partisanship and policy preferences have long been among the most studied
determinants of vote choice in presidential elections. Classic studies like The
American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960) found party identification to be of central
importance for ballot choice. In contrast seminal rational choice works like An
Economic Theory of Democracy (Downs 1957) placed issues and ideology at the
forefront without considering psychological concepts like party identification. Over
time scholarly knowledge about the effects of partisanship and issues has grown
considerably, and it is now common to find explanations of vote choice that
emphasize issues and partisanship (e.g., Miller and Shanks 1996; Adams et al. 2005;
Lewis-Beck et al. 2008).
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While individual-level models of voting behavior consistently reveal effects of
issues and partisanship, variation in these effects across elections has received less
attention. This paper’s central focus is how the political context determines the
magnitude of influence issue preferences and partisanship exert on the choice
between presidential candidates. Drawing on a variety of theoretical perspectives, I
suggest that this variation may be explained by the behavior of political parties and
their candidates. Levels of party mobilization, party polarization, and candidate
polarization may all be significant.
Analyzing these relationships is important for several reasons. First, there are a
variety of competing explanations regarding why issues and partisanship influence
voting behavior that cannot be assessed through cross-sectional analyses of data from
a single election. For example, to determine if the effect of party identification is
conditioned by the level of elite party polarization (Wattenberg 1998; Bartels 2000) it
is necessary to examine multiple elections to provide variation in elite polarization.
Second, key questions about the nature of electoral accountability can be addressed. If
voters respond to party issue contrast, then the party centric view of politics is
strengthened, especially if voters are more responsive to party contrast than to
candidate contrast. On the other hand, if party contrast is less important, then the
possibility for candidates and their behavior to influence voting is enhanced. In
addition, to the extent that voters respond to candidate issue contrast, the amount of
issue voting is a short-term factor, subject to change, sometimes, dramatic change,
from one election to the next. If voters primarily respond to party issue contrast, then
issue voting is better conceived as a long-term force because while party issue contrast
may change over time, it is likely to change only incrementally from one election to
the next. Related, some models of elections emphasize the importance of party issue
reputations, and by implication party issue contrast, as relatively easy heuristics for
voters to use in an electoral environment where policy information about candidates is
scarce and uncertainty is common (Snyder and Ting 2002, 2003; Woon and Pope
2008). These models are typically applied to low information elections, and if the
underlying logic is correct, then party reputations should be much less important in
presidential elections where information about the candidates is abundant. Because
information about presidential candidates is more plentiful and easier to obtain in
comparison to congressional candidates, presidential elections provide a useful
context to assess claims about more general propositions about the role of information
for electoral behavior. Finally, analyzing how the individual-level effects of
partisanship and issues relate to characteristics of the political context contributes
to the larger movement toward viewing political behavior as the product of individual
characteristics interacting with the environment in which those decisions are made.
The empirical analysis is based on the nine presidential elections from 1972 to
2004. The data primarily come from the American National Election Studies
surveys conducted in the midst and immediate aftermath of those campaigns. While
the raw materials are individual attitudes and behaviors of voters, the explanatory
leverage derives from comparisons across elections. As such, this paper follows in
the tradition started by Stokes (1966) in his investigation of ‘‘Some Dynamic
Elements of Contests for the Presidency’’ and continued in work like that of Erikson
et al. (2002) on the Macropolity and Zaller (2004) on ‘‘Floating Voters.’’
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Policy Voting
Issues and their influence on the vote have long had a place on the mass behavior
research agenda.1 As commonly observed, in order for issue preferences to influence
ballot choices, the choice presented to voters must provide policy alternatives. If
voters are choosing between two alternatives both of which represent identical—
real and perceived—ideological and policy options, then there is no reason the votes
of those with liberal preferences to differ from the ballot choices of those with
conservative preferences (Berelson et al. 1954; Downs 1957; Campbell et al. 1960;
Key 1966). When there is contrast between the alternatives, voters’ issue
preferences may influence them to choose one over the other, and the larger the
ideological and policy divide, the more influential voters’ preferences are typically
expected to be.2
The question addressed in this paper is to what ‘‘alternatives’’ refers. Presidential
general elections are contests between candidates from different parties, as most
general elections in the United States are. Because parties are ideologically
heterogeneous, in any given election the amount of candidate policy contrast and
party policy contrast need not be identical. Even in contemporary U.S. politics
where the parties have become more internally unified and distinct from each other,
neither the Democratic nor Republican parties are ideological monoliths (McCarty
et al. 2006). And, nothing in the elaborate and continually revised process of
selecting party nominees for president suggests, let alone guarantees, that the
eventual nominees will represent the ‘‘median’’ partisans. To be sure, the fact that
candidates are chosen from their respective parties might cause the level of
candidate contrast to be influenced by the level of party contrast.3 But, there is
ample room for the correlation to be less than perfect.
Theoretically, voters might respond to parties, candidates, or both. The case for
responsiveness to parties begins with the party centric view of political thinking
(Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Green et al. 2002). To the extent that parties
are central elements of the voters’ belief systems, the implication is that policy
preferences will be more influential at separating Democratic and Republican voters
when the policy and ideological contrast between the parties is greater. Thus the
authors of The American Voter conceived of responsiveness in terms of party
contrast. They claimed that an ‘‘issue will have no meaningful bearing on partisan
choice unless the person can discriminate between the policies of the two parties in
the matter’’ (Campbell et al. 1960, 179, italics added).4
1 I use the terms policy preferences and issue preferences interchangeably.
2 This notion follows directly from spatial theories of voting. In addition, the effect of policy preferences
may be magnified further in instances of greater contrast due to the behavior of the mass media. If the
media pays greater attention to issues in elections where the contrast between choices is greater, then
policy preferences may become even more influential for differentiating vote choices than one would
expect on the basis of spatial theory alone.
3 I return to this point in the Discussion.
4 Key (1966) provides a similar rationale leading to a focus on responsiveness in terms of party positions.
‘‘Standpatters stay by the party even… [when] they agree with the opposition party (Key 1966, p. 150).
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There is also an informational rationale for responsiveness to party issue contrast.
Snyder and Ting (2002, 2003) posit that voters perceive and respond to party
ideological and issue locations but not to those of their respective candidates. The
logic derives from the proposition that information about party ideological and issue
reputations is more plentiful and less uncertain, making it a low cost and useful
heuristic.5 Along with Woon and Pope (2008), Snyder and Ting apply the model to
House elections and find evidence supporting it. Because candidates change from
one election to the next while parties are relatively stable, party issue reputations
may serve as useful heuristics in presidential elections, too.
Alternatively, while party issue reputations may be easily accessible, in
presidential elections, compared to congressional ones, there is much more
information made available about the candidates’ ideological and issue positions
that may serve to reduce voters’ uncertainty about them. If voters rely on party issue
reputations as a heuristic when candidate issue reputations are difficult to discern,
then in presidential elections voters may rely less on party issue reputations and shift
their attention and be more responsive to the candidates’ positions. In addition,
while most descriptive accounts of media coverage of presidential elections find that
there is much more emphasis on topics like the horserace and the candidates’
personal characteristics, to the extent that there is issue coverage, it tends to be cast
in terms of the candidates’ positions, not those of their respective parties. These
considerations suggest the possibility that in presidential elections voters will be
more responsive to candidate policy contrast.
The available empirical evidence is only partially helpful for understanding
whether and how voters respond to party and candidate issue contrast. With regard
to candidate positions, a variety of studies suggest that candidate contrast is
important. In Senate elections, the level of candidate issue contrast has been found
to moderate the influence of voters’ policy preferences on their choices (e.g.,
Abramowitz 1981; Wright and Berkman 1986; Highton 2004). At the presidential
level, Page and Brody (1972) attribute the lack of any apparent influence of voters’
preferences regarding the Vietnam War on presidential voting in the 1968 election
to the lack of notable contrast in the positions of Humphrey and Nixon.6 Looking
across several presidential elections Nie et al. (1976) report larger differences
between policy liberals and conservatives in elections with greater contrast in the
candidates’ issue positions. While the evidence is consistent with the view that the
magnitude of candidate issue contrast is important, there are important unanswered
questions. None of the studies considers the possibility that party issue contrast may
5 This also appears to be the motivating idea behind the view expressed in Voting:
[T]he individual voter may not have a great deal of detailed information, but he usually has picked
up the crucial general information, as part of his social learning itself… [H]e cannot live in an
American community without knowing broadly where the parties stand. He has learned that the
Republicans are more conservative and the Democrats more liberal—and he can locate his own
sentiments and cast his vote accordingly (Berelson et al. 1954, 321).
6 Page and Brody (1972) also found that the public perceived McCarthy as more dovish and Reagan as
more hawkish and found that in a simulated election ‘‘between McCarthy and Reagan, Vietnam
preferences had a sizable impact—much greater than in the actual Humphrey-Nixon election’’ (p. 993).
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be an influential factor and its effects are unexamined. Related, insight into the
relative contributions of party and candidate issue contrast is lacking, leaving open
the question of whether voters are primarily responsive to parties or to the
candidates who run as their standard bearers.7
Party Identification and Vote Choice
Party identification is commonly understood as a relatively stable and enduring
psychological attachment to a political party that is part of an individual’s social
identity (Campbell et al. 1960; Miller and Merrill Shanks 1996; Green et al. 2002).8
In elections between candidates of competing parties, one expects partisanship to
influence ballot choice as many voters affirm their partisan identities by casting
ballots for the candidates who share their party labels. However, just as the larger
electoral context may shape the influence of issue preferences on ballot decisions, it
may determine how much partisanship matters. Indeed, the relationship between
partisanship and presidential voting over time suggests that a purely psychological
explanation for why partisanship influences vote choice is inadequate. If the
explanation for partisanship as a cause of vote choice depends on internal factors
only, then there is no reason to expect the influence of partisanship to vary across a
set of elections all of which feature a Democratic candidate running against a
Republican one. Yet, research on the ‘‘decline’’ and ‘‘revival’’ of partisanship over
the past fifty years suggests that the influence of partisanship on vote choice does
vary from one election to the next (Miller 1991; Miller and Merrill Shanks 1996;
Wattenberg 1998; Bartels 2000).
There are several aspects of the political context that may be important. One
explanation for the influence of partisanship on vote choice views the effect as an
instance of mass response to the level of partisanship among elites.
[A] plausible hypothesis is that increasing partisanship in the electorate
represents a response at the mass level to increasing partisanship at the elite
level. ‘‘If parties in government are weakened,’’ Wattenberg argued, ‘‘the
public will naturally have less of a stimulus to think of themselves politically
in partisan terms’’ (1996, p. 4). But then the converse may also be true: in an
era in which parties in government seem increasingly consequential, the public
may increasingly come to develop and apply partisan predispositions of
7 Nie et al. (1976) is an important study because it compares the influence of policy preferences across
elections. But due to changes in survey instrumentation, the indicators of policy preferences also vary
across elections, raising the question of whether the observed differences in policy voting are
methodological artifacts.
8 While ‘‘revisionist’’ theories that conceive of party identification as responsive to short-term forces
have sometimes been advanced, the accumulated empirical evidence is more consistent with the original
view. Individual stability in party identification is quite high; it is nearly immune from the influence of
short term forces; and, partisanship influences a wide variety of other political attitudes much more so
than being influenced by them (Green and Philip 1990, 1994; Schickler and Green 1995; Green et al.
2002; Bartels 2002).
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exactly the sort described by the authors of The American Voter (Bartels 2000,
p. 44).
Driven by a variety of factors, the parties in government have become increasingly
consequential as ideological differences have been on the rise over the past several
decades (Rohde 1991; McCarty et al. 2006; Theriault 2008). And the rate picked up
considerably in the 1990s. Hetherington (2001) explicitly links this polarization to
‘‘resurgent mass partisanship’’ in a variety of public opinion indicators. The
unanswered question addressed here is whether the growing party polarization in
government may have caused the influence of partisanship on presidential voting to
grow as well.
A second explanation that predicts variation in the influence of party
identification on vote choice focuses on the role that party organizations can serve
in ‘‘activating’’ and ‘‘reinforcing’’ partisanship. Lazarsfeld et al. (1948) introduced
these terms to describe (a) the process by which undecided voters come to ‘‘join the
fold to which they belong’’ (activation), and (b) how partisans are kept ‘‘in line’’
with the consequence of reducing defection (reinforcement). While party contact
has been extensively analyzed as a cause of turnout (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993)
it is important to note that when parties attempt to mobilize voters, they are not
merely trying to increase turnout; they are trying to increase votes for their
respective candidates. If one election is marked by more party efforts than another,
then it is plausible to hypothesize that the influence of partisanship on vote choice
will be larger due to greater levels of activation and reinforcement caused by those
party efforts.
Research Design
The nine presidential elections between 1972 and 2004 are the focus of the
empirical analysis. Ideally, even more elections would be included, but the
necessary individual-level survey data extends back only until 1972. Those data are
from the American National Election Studies presidential year surveys. When
modeling the determinants of vote choice, only major party voters are included.9
The approach I adopt is to estimate separately the individual-level determinants of
vote choice in each of the nine elections. To test the issue voting hypotheses I focus
on the ‘‘total’’ issue effect in each election—described below—and analyze how it
varies with candidate and party issue contrast. I test the hypotheses about why
partisanship influences vote choice by comparing patterns of change in the effect of
party identification across elections to those for party elite polarization and party
voter contacting.
9 In most years this decision is necessarily inconsequential because minor party and independent
presidential candidates receive hardly any votes. The 1992 election, where Ross Perot received nearly
20% of the vote, is potentially more problematic, but as will be apparent, none of the hypothesis tests
depends on the results for 1992. Moreover, both Bartels (2000), which analyzes presidential elections
over time, and Miller and Shanks (1996), which offers a book length treatment of the 1992 election,
exclude Perot voters when analyzing the determinants of vote choice in 1992.
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The key measures in the individual-level vote choice models are issue attitudes
and partisanship.10 To measure voters’ issue attitudes, I use five questions asked In
identical fashion in each of the nine surveys that cover general ideological,
economic, racial, and cultural divides in America. The first is a question about
ideology that asks respondents to place themselves on a scale ranging from very
liberal to very conservative (libcon).11 The second scale is about whether the
government should guarantee people jobs or whether the government should let
people get ahead on their own (jobs). The third asks whether the government should
make every effort to improve the condition of blacks and minorities or whether they
should help themselves (black aid). The fourth runs from the belief that women and
men should have an equal role in running business, industry, and government to the
view that a women’s place is in the home (women’s role). The last issue question
gives respondents four options regarding the conditions under which a woman
should be allowed to have an abortion (abortion).12 I coded responses to all five
questions to range from 0 (most liberal response) to 1 (most conservative
response).13
The measure of the total issue effect in a given election is the sum of the
estimated effects for each of the five policy preference items. The motivating idea is
that each of the items is an indicator of underlying policy preferences and that there
is likely overlap across indicators, which makes it less meaningful to interpret the
apparent influence of any single measure rather than interpreting the joint influence
of them all (Achen 1985; Ansolabehere et al. 2008). By taking the sum of the five
estimates, I produce a quantity that estimates how different the vote choice of an
individual who chooses the most liberal option on all five questions would be from
an individual who chooses the most conservative option on all five questions.14
Comparing this quantity across elections and observing how it correlates with
10 Consistent with other studies of presidential voting, the individual vote choice models also include a
set of demographic control variables: family income, education, region (the South, defined as the 11
former Confederate states), union membership, sex, race, religion (Catholic, mainline Protestant,
evangelical Protestant, and Jewish), and frequency of church/synagogue attendance. By estimating
separate models for each presidential election, the effects of all of these variables are allowed to vary
across elections.
11 In the 2000 survey some respondents were asked the usual ideology question and others were
randomly selected to be asked an experimental version of the questions. The latter respondents are
excluded from the analysis.
12 The wording of the abortion question modestly changed in 1980. Fortunately both the old and new
versions were included in the 1980 ANES survey. The empirical results are nearly identical regardless of
which version is used in 1980.
13 Respondents who did not choose a position/location on the items were assigned the mean value for the
item in the designated year. Among major party voters, fully 88% of respondents chose locations for four
or five of the items and 96% located themselves on at least three.
14 This approach is similar to creating a measure of issue attitudes based on the indicators and using that
measure as an independent variable in the vote choice model (Bartels 2006). The primary difference is
that including the separate indicators and then summing their effects allows the effects of the indicators to
vary while the former method entails the implicit assumption that the effects are equal across indicators.
That said, the findings regarding the responsiveness of voters to candidate issue contrast and party issue
contrast are nearly identical when an issue scale is used rather than taking the sum of the individual issue
effects.
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candidate and party contrast makes it possible to test the hypotheses regarding the
causes of issue voting.
To measure party identification, I rely on the standard ANES questions that ask
respondents whether they consider themselves Democrats or Republicans, whether
those feelings are strong, and if respondents do not consider themselves partisans,
whether they feel closer to one of the two parties. In light of previous research
showing that ‘‘weak’’ partisans and ‘‘leaners’’ are quite similar on a host of political
dimensions and distinguished from ‘‘strong’’ partisans (Keith et al. 1992), I use a
five category measure that distinguishes strong Democrats, weak and leaning
Democrats, weak and leaning Republicans, strong Republicans, and others, who are
placed at the midpoint of the scale.15
There are four measures of the political context used in the analysis. To measure
candidate and party issue contrast, I rely on NES questions that ask respondents to
place the parties and candidates on four scales that match four of the policy
questions used in the vote choice models, ideology, government guaranteed jobs,
federal aid to blacks, and the proper social role for women.16 To provide an
election-level measure of candidate issue contrast, I compute the average locations
for each candidate on each indicator. The average difference across the four items
serves as the election-level measure of candidate contrast, and is as described more
fully in the Appendix. I do the same for party contrast. To facilitate interpretation, I
rescale each to range from the lowest observed value for the nine elections (0) to the
highest (1). The results are displayed in Fig. 1. The candidates were least polarized
in 1976 (by a large margin) and most polarized in 2004 (barely more than in 1996).
The parties were least polarized in 1972 and most polarized in 2004.17 Importantly,
there is far from a perfect association between the two types of issue contrast—the
correlation is .51—which means empirical tests of the responsiveness hypotheses
are possible.
The other two contextual measures are used to test the partisanship hypotheses.
Wattenberg (1998) and Bartels (2000) identify party polarization in government as a
cause of the influence of partisanship on voting behavior in the mass public. One
way scholars commonly measure party polarization in government, or elite party
polarization, is with the difference in the average ideological location of Democratic
and Republican House members using McCarty et al.’s (2006) first dimension DW-
15 Two other possibilities are a three point scale based on the initial question of whether one considers
oneself a Democrat, Republican or something else and a seven point scale that differentiates strong, weak,
and leaning partisans of each party from pure independents. Empirically, the choice makes little
difference for the substantive results.
16 The NES surveys do not ask respondents to place the candidates and parties on abortion policy, the
fifth indicator of policy preferences I use, but ideological placements are probably influenced by them,
especially in later years as abortion became a more salient political issue. And, because they tap the
cultural dimension, placements regarding the proper role for women are likely correlated with placements
regarding abortion.
17 Note the importance of the 1972 election. It provides excellent leverage because while it is the election
with the least party issue polarization, it is near the top with regard to candidate issue polarization. To the
extent that voters are responsive to candidate issue contrast, 1972 would be marked by a higher level of
policy voting and to the extent that party contrast matters, 1972 should evince quite low relative levels of
policy voting.
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NOMINATE scores. For individual members these scores typically range from -1
(the most liberal) to ?1 (the most conservative). Using this measure, polarization
increased from .55 in 1972 to .88 in 2004. The other hypothesized cause of
fluctuations in the effect of partisanship on presidential voting is party mobilization.
To measure the level of mobilization I rely on the NES question routinely posed to
respondents that asks whether they have been contacted by political parties during
the campaign. Like the trend for party polarization in government, more recent
elections are marked by higher levels of party mobilization.
Results
For each presidential election, I estimated a probit model of vote choice.18 To test
the policy voting hypotheses, it is necessary to obtain estimates of the total influence
of issue preferences in each election. To do this, I begin with the estimated effects of
each of the five policy indicators in each election: libcon, jobs, black aid, abortion,
and women’s role. With all the variables coded on 0/1 scale, the sum of the five
coefficients is the probit estimate of the effect of providing the most liberal response
to each item in comparison to providing the most conservative response. The key
question is how this quantity varies with the levels of candidate issue contrast and
party issue contrast. Table 1 provides the raw material for the answer. For each






























Fig. 1 Presidential candidate issue contrast and party issue contrast, 1972–2004
18 The parameter estimates, standard errors, fit statistics, and numbers of observations are reported in the
Appendix.
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of candidate and party contrast. Two elections stand out as having especially high
levels of issue voting, those of 1996 and 2004. The lowest level of policy voting was
in the 1976 election.
To assess how the levels of policy voting relate to the levels of candidate and
party contrast. Table 2 reports the results of a series of OLS regressions where the
total level of policy voting is regressed on the levels of candidate and party issue
contrast. The first row of estimates is from a regression including all nine
presidential elections between 1972 and 2004. With candidate and party contrast
coded to range from their lowest (0) to their highest (1) observed levels, the entries
for the unstandardized coefficients indicate how much of an increase in policy
voting one would expect in an election with maximum observed contrast compared
to one with minimum observed contrast for the respective measures.19
Policy voting appears more responsive to candidate issue contrast than party
issue contrast. The estimated effect of party contrast is .35 (p = .54) while the
estimated effect of candidate contrast is four times larger 1.41 (p = .07). Similar
relative effects are evident in the standardized coefficients (.19 for party contrast
versus .66 for candidate contrast). While the effect of candidate contrast is large
relative to the effect of party contrast, it also appears large relative to the baseline
level predicted when candidate and party divergence are at their observed
minimums. In this instance, the predicted level of issue voting is 1.86. The
coefficient of 1.41 for candidate divergence suggests that the level of policy voting
would be predicted to almost double to 3.27 (1.86 ? 1.41) in an election with the
maximum observed level of candidate contrast.
With just nine observations, it is possible that the results regarding the effects of
candidate and party contrast on the level of issue voting are driven by a single
Table 1 Candidate issue contrast, party issue contrast, and the level of issue voting, 1972–2004
Election year Candidate contrast Party contrast Total issue effect
1972 .83 0 2.98
1976 0 .17 2.15
1980 .81 .80 2.68
1984 .57 .32 2.98
1988 .73 .38 2.60
1992 .70 .63 3.10
1996 .94 .80 4.04
2000 .63 .88 2.67
2004 1 1 3.98
Notes: Candidate issue contrast and party issue contrast are described in detail in the main text and the
Appendix. Each is scaled to range from 0 (the lowest observed value) to 1 (the highest observed value).
The ‘‘total issue effect’’ for each year is based on the probit models of presidential vote reported in
Appendix Table 4. The total issue effect is the sum of the estimated effects of the five policy preference
indicators
19 The constant indicates the expected level of policy voting in an election where contrast is at its
minimum observed levels for both.
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outlying case. To investigate this possibility, I reestimated the model nine times,
each time excluding one of the nine election years. The results are also displayed in
Table 2 and are reassuring. The influence of any single election does not drive the
finding that issue voting is substantially more responsive to candidate issue contrast
than party issue contrast. Across the nine replications, the effect of candidate
contrast ranges from 1.19 to 2.63 (the standardized effects range from .57 to .74)
while the effect of party contrast ranges from .14 to .62 (the standardized effects
range from .08 to .33).
Turning to the effects of party identification, if elite party polarization and party
voter contacting enhance the influence of individual partisanship on vote choice,
then the over time trends should move together. Table 3 shows the values of for all
three variables for each of the nine elections. The first set of entries reports the
values of the variables after smoothing the year-to-year values to diminish the
idiosyncratic effects (including sampling variability) of individual elections that can
obscure longer term trends.20 (The second set of estimates reports the actual values.)
Consistent with previous research, the effect of partisanship and the levels of elite
party polarization in government and party contacting have all increased over time.
However, the patterns of increase raise doubts about whether the influence of
partisanship depends on elite polarization or party contacting. From 1972 to 2004,
the estimated effect of partisanship on presidential voting increased .85, from 2.49
to 3.34. Significantly, virtually all of the increase occurred in the first half of the
Table 2 Responsiveness of policy voting to candidate and party issue contrast
Dependent variable = total issue effect
Election year
excluded











None (n = 9) 1.86 (.41) 1.41 (.64) .35 (.54) .66 .19 .47
1972 1.87 (.46) 1.52 (.98) .21 (1.01) .70 .09 .45
1976 .91 (.88) 2.63 (1.19) .28 (.52) .69 .17 .41
1980 1.83 (.37) 1.43 (.57) .52 (.49) .67 .29 .62
1984 1.79 (.47) 1.42 (.68) .40 (.59) .66 .21 .47
1988 1.91 (.42) 1.52 (.65) .21 (.55) .74 .12 .51
1992 1.85 (.46) 1.41 (.70) .34 (.59) .66 .19 .44
1996 1.97 (.38) 1.20 (.58) .25 (.48) .67 .17 .42
2000 1.91 (.42) 1.19 (.68) .62 (.61) .57 .33 .51
2004 2.00 (.44) 1.28 (.65) .14 (.57) .67 .08 .31
Notes: Candidate and party issue contrast are scaled to range from 0 (lowest observed value) to 1 (highest
observed value). When no election years are excluded n = 9 (first row). Total issue effects are based on
the results reported in Table 1 and Appendix Table 4. Standard errors are in parentheses
20 The smoothing technique is locally weighted regression (lowess).
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period, .76 from 1972 to 1988, compared to just .09 from 1988 to 2004. In contrast,
it was in the second half of the period that party polarization and contacting
increased the most. About two-thirds of the increase in party polarization occurred
in the second half of the period compared to the first (.23 vs .10) while party
contacting declined .08 in the first half of the period before increasing .25 in the
second. The same patterns are evident using the second set of entries, based on the
actual, unsmoothed, estimates. If the influence of partisanship on presidential voting
depends in a significant way on either party polarization or party contacting, then
the effect of partisanship would have increased more substantially in the second half
of the period rather than the first.21 Thus while the results reported here are
consistent with the claim that there has been a resurgence of partisanship in
presidential voting, they suggest that new explanations for the increase may be
necessary, a point I return to below.

















1972 2.49 .55 .36 2.45 .55 .35
1976 2.68 .56 .33 2.76 .55 .35
1980 2.90 .58 .31 2.77 .57 .28
1984 3.09 .61 .29 3.20 .62 .28
1988 3.25 .65 .28 3.32 .65 .30
1992 3.34 .70 .31 3.40 .67 .25
1996 3.39 .76 .37 3.26 .79 .33
2000 3.38 .83 .44 3.61 .83 .48
2004 3.34 .88 .53 3.26 .88 .52
Change
(1972–1988) .76 .10 -.08 .87 .10 -.05
Change
(1988–2004) .09 .23 .25 -.06 .23 .22
Notes: For each election year, a probit model of presidential vote was estimated with party identification,
five policy preference indicators, and a set of demographic characteristics as independent variables. The
entries for ‘‘effect of PID’’ report the probit estimates (see Appendix Table 4). Level of elite party
polarization is the difference in average DW-NOMINATE scores between Democratic and Republican
members of Congress. Proportion contacted is the proportion of voting partisans that report being con-
tacted by one of the parties. See main text for more extensive descriptions. Smoothed estimates are based
on lowess regressions
21 Even with a model that excludes issue attitudes, the apparent increase in the influence of partisanship
on presidential voting is concentrated in the 1970s and 1980s rather than the 1990s and 2000s when elite
polarization contacting were increased more substantially.
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Discussion and Conclusion
From one election to the next, the political context in which voters cast their ballots
may change in a variety of ways. This paper has been concerned with the
implications for the determinants of voting behavior. The first broad theoretical
concern of the paper was with the nature of issue voting and whether voters respond
to issue contrast between the parties and their respective candidates. Contrary to the
party centric view espoused in The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960),
candidate contrast appears to drive the magnitude of issue voting with little direct
responsiveness to party contrast evident in the results. Whether the parties were
more or less divergent on policy issues was barely related to the effect of issue
preferences on presidential vote choice. This result is consistent with the rationale
offered by Snyder and Ting (2002, 2003) and Woon and Pope (2008) for why party
reputations matter in low information elections. These studies claim that party issue
reputations are easy heuristics to rely on when candidate locations are hard to
discern as they typically are in low information elections. Had evidence of
responsiveness to party issue contrast been evident in presidential elections (the
epitome of ‘‘high information’’ elections), then the claim that voters rely on party
reputations in low information elections because information about candidates is
scarce and uncertain would be less convincing.
The finding that voters are not especially responsive to party issue contrast does
not imply that party positions are insignificant factors in presidential elections.
Candidates are selected by their respective parties and therefore to explain the level
of candidate issue contrast one would naturally turn to the level of party issue
contrast. When the parties are more internally unified and more differentiated from
each other, it is reasonable to expect a higher level of candidate contrast than when
party differences are muted. The association between party contrast and candidate
contrast (recall Fig. 1) is more likely due to the causal effect of the former on the
latter than vice versa. Thus, party contrast may not exert much of a direct effect on
the structure of presidential vote choice, but its indirect effect is likely substantial.
That said, there is far from an iron law relationship between candidate and party
contrast as the 1972 presidential election makes perfectly clear. Party contrast was
its lowest level of the nine election analyzed in this paper, yet candidate contrast
was much higher.
The second, related, theoretical concern of the paper was with explaining why
partisanship influences vote choice. In this regard, the paper’s contribution derives
from ruling out two plausible hypotheses. Neither the changes in elite party
polarization nor party contacting match the observation that the growth in the effect
of party identification on presidential voting was concentrated in the 1970s and
1980s, not the 1990s and 2000s when elite party polarization and party contacting
were increasing more substantially. The implication is that future research should
focus on the 1972–1988 period to identify other potential causes of ‘‘resurgent of
partisanship.’’ One possible avenue would be to consider the images of the parties in
relation to the social groups associated with them (Green et al. 2002). If the post-
Civil Rights and early countercultural periods left the party images more ambiguous
than they had been (and would become), then one would expect the influence of
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partisanship on voting behavior (and other forms of political behavior and public
opinion) to be weakened. If the period from 1972 to 1988 marks the time when the
party images clarified again, then it may explain the growing influence of
partisanship on presidential voting.
The view that elite party polarization is not the force behind the increasing
influence of partisanship on presidential voting is at odds with leading accounts of
the resurgence of partisanship in the mass public (Wattenberg 1998; Bartels 2000;
Hetherington 2001). These studies identify growing levels of elite party polarization
in government as the cause of the growing importance of partisanship in the mass
public. Of the three, only Hetherington (2001) attempts to test directly the
hypothesis and reports strong results from regressing a variety of partisanship
indicators on the level of elite party polarization. But, these findings may be
methodological artifacts. The tests focus on the 1984–1996 period when the
indicators of partisanship and elite polarization were all trending upward.22 As a
result, even if there was no causal effect of polarization on partisanship, an ‘‘effect’’
would have been found because of the common upward trend.23 In a case like this it
is necessary to compare changes in the amount of change rather than changes in
levels.24
Finally, a larger implication of this study relates to Key’s (1966) metaphor of the
electoral system as an ‘‘echo chamber.’’ While he emphasized the interrelationships
between voters, candidates, and parties, it has taken decades for political scientists
to invest substantial energy into the elaboration of the nature of those links. By
analyzing how the effects of party identification and issue preferences—two of the
most commonly identified influences on presidential voting—depend on the larger
political context, this paper contributes to that effort. Although questions remain to
be answered, the conclusion that the answers will require continued attention to the
connections between voters and the environment in which they make their decisions
rests on firm footing.
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22 See Hetherington (2001), Table 1.
23 Any independent variable with an upward trend, even one with no plausible causal relationship to
partisanship—say, average global temperature—would appear to ‘‘cause’’ partisanship in this situation.
24 In the present study, the correlation between the effect of partisanship on presidential voting and elite
party polarization is .83, reflecting the fact that both were increasing during the entire period under
analysis. But the correlation between the change in the effect of partisanship (between the current and
previous election) and the change in the level of elite polarization is -.85, reflecting the fact that when the
effect of party identification changed most (early in the period) the level of elite polarization changed
least and vice versa (later in the period).
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Appendix
Measuring Candidate and Party Policy Contrast
To construct a composite election-level measure of candidate policy contrast, I rely
on four sets of questions. ANES respondents have routinely been asked to place
presidential candidates on the libcon, black aid, jobs, and women’s role scales. At
the individual level, questions like these are subject to a variety of biases. For
example, people who like a candidate for other reasons are likely to place that
candidate closer to their preferred location while placing candidates they dislike
further away. A common approach to address problems like this is to compute the
average of the individual responses, which has the effect of reducing substantially
the influence of individual biases because they tend to cancel out in the aggregate
(e.g., Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989; Zaller 2004). These aggregate indicators of
‘‘candidate reputations’’ have been demonstrated to be closely related to actual
locations as measured by voting records and candidate surveys (Erikson 1990;
Burden et al. 2000). For each item I compute the mean and then the difference
between the candidates to produce indicators of candidate divergence. All four
indicators are available for every election except 1984 (women’s role was not asked)
and 1992 (black aid and women’s role were not asked). For these missing indicators,
I imputed values based on the observed values of the other variables and their
interrelationships in other years. The overall measure of candidate divergence in an
election is the average of these four differences in each election year. As Appendix
Fig. 2 shows, these indicators tend to move together. (In this figure each indicator is
standardized to mean = 0 and standard deviation = 1.) The most notable exception
is 1980 where libcon moves toward less divergence (compared to 1976) while the
other indicators (especially black aid and women’s role) move toward greater
divergence. Fortunately, as shown in Table 2, the issue voting responsiveness
results do not significantly depend on whether the 1980 election is included or
excluded from the analysis.
The composite measure of election-level party policy contrast is constructed in a
similar fashion. However, there are more imputations for the indicators of party
divergence because the party location questions were not asked in some years for
jobs (1996), black aid (1992, 1996) and women’s role (1984, 1992, 1996, 2000).
This is less problematic than it would be for candidate contrast because there is less
election-to-election variation in party locations. And, there is another indicator of
party contrast available for the imputations, the level of party polarization in
Congress (Fig. 1). Appendix Fig. 3 shows how the four indicators move together.
Like the indicators of candidate divergence, 1980 appears to stand out, but as noted
above, this has little effect on the substantive findings reported in the paper.
Election-by-Election Individual Vote Choice Models
As described in the main text, for each of the nine presidential elections from 1972
to 2004, I estimated a vote choice model that included the five indicators of issue
attitudes, party identification, and a battery of demographic variables. By estimating

































Fig. 3 Indicators of party policy contrast
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separate models for each election, there is no constraint placed on how (if at all) the
effects vary from one election to the next. The parameter estimates, standard errors,
model fit statistics, and numbers of observations are reported in Appendix Table 4.
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